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Abstract:  
 
This briefing paper provides an overview of the existing European Union approach to 
issues of security, counter-terrorism, and organised crime. In particular, it focuses on 
the role of the European Security Strategy (ESS) in the formation of policy and in the 
development of new institutions and institutional arrangements within the EU, and the 
influence of the Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA).  
 
The paper argues that steps should be taken to streamline and rationalise the existing 
structures concerned with security, counter-terrorism and organised crime, and 
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and institutions concerned with security, counter-terrorism and organised crime.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
This briefing paper provides an overview of the existing European Union approach to 
issues of security, counter-terrorism, and organised crime. In particular, it focuses on 
the role of the European Security Strategy (ESS) in the formation of policy and the 
development of new institutions and institutional arrangements within the EU, and the 
influence of the Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA). 
 
Based on the evidence presented in this paper, it appears clear that the ESS has played 
a major role in improving awareness of the need for greater coordination between EU 
and national agencies as regards the promotion of security, counter-terrorism activity, 
and the investigation and prosecution of organised crime. Given that the EU has no 
formal powers to mandate how individual Member States address these issues, the 
ESS has proved to be an effective mechanism for promoting collaborative efforts 
between Member States and the EU, and has led to the strengthening of a number of 
existing EU institutions, including Europol. Likewise, the OCTA has led to increased 
awareness of the problem of organised crime in the EU, and has helped to foster 
information sharing and police cooperation across Member States. 
 
Despite these successes, the EU approach to security, counter-terrorism and organised 
crime remains fragmented and characterised by high levels of bureaucracy, 
inefficiency, and institutional inertia. In part, this stems from the fact that no single 
agency or individual currently has responsibility for these matters. Although the 
introduction of the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator has led to some improvements in 
this area, he has struggled to provide the sort of overarching management and 
strategic planning required by the ESS. Furthermore, the reluctance of individual 
Member States to grant additional powers or commit additional resources to agencies 
like Europol has meant that the EU has been limited in its ability to provide the sort of 
central support and guidance that is clearly needed.  
 
In light of these and other concerns, this briefing paper recommends that steps be 
taken to streamline and rationalise the existing structures concerned with security, 
counter-terrorism and organised crime. Given the number of agencies either directly 
or indirectly involved in the gathering of information, the production of intelligence, 
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and the development of policy, it is extremely difficult for the EU to develop 
strategies that go beyond the most general statements of intent and calls for greater 
cooperation between Member States. With this point in mind, this briefing paper 
concludes by strongly recommending the creation of a central “Committee on Internal 
Security”, which can act as an single point of reference and clearinghouse for the 
work of the various EU agencies and institutions concerned with security, as well as 
provide the sort of direction and policy coordination that is currently needed.  
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Introduction 
 
In the aftermath of the events of September 11th in the United States and subsequent 
terrorist attacks in Madrid and London, there has been growing recognition within the 
European Union of the need for Member States to work more closely on matters of 
security and policing. In addition, in recent years organised crime has come to be 
regarded by many as a key threat to the internal security of the EU, and a problem that 
requires a coordinated and concerted response from Member States.  
 
This briefing paper provides an overview of institutional arrangements and policies 
that have been developed within the European Union to respond to the dual threats of 
terrorism and organised crime. In particular, this paper focuses on the relationships 
between the various agencies responsible for monitoring and generating intelligence 
on terrorism and organised crime, and suggests a number of ways in which existing 
intelligence sharing and operational practices might be improved.  
 
For the sake of clarity and accessibility, this briefing paper is divided into three main 
sections. Section One considers the development and major aims of the European 
Security Strategy, and provides an overview of the key institutions and arrangements 
involved in its implementation. Section Two then examines the role played by 
Europol and other EU agencies in the fight against organised crime and the 
development of the Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA). In addition, this 
section considers the role played by a range of other EU and national institutions in 
the promotion of security and the policing of organised crime. Finally, Section Three 
concludes the report by identifying some of the key challenges facing the existing 
security and policing framework.  
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Section One: Security and Counter-Terrorism in the EU 
 
1.1 The European Security Strategy (ESS) 
 
At the heart of the European Union’s approach to questions of security and the threat 
of terrorism is the European Security Strategy (ESS).1 Drafted by the EU’s High 
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Janvier Solana, the 
policy was adopted by the Brussels European Council in December 2003. The product 
of the collective thinking and shared experiences of the Member States, the strategy 
establishes a common approach to questions of security and sets out three clear 
objectives:  
 
(1) to identify global challenges and key threats to the security of the EU; 
(2) to build security in the EU neighbourhood; and  
(3) to promote an international order based on effective multilateralism as regards 
matters of security. 
 
In the five years since it was first adopted, the ESS has come to be regarded as a 
central component of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), and as such 
it informs much of the activity that takes place within the EU under the auspices of 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy pillar. As has been noted by Professor 
François Heisbourg of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, it is important 
to recognise, however, that the ESS is not a strategy in the traditional sense. It does 
not, for example, contain a detailed list of recommendations or set out a specific 
programme of action. Instead, it presents what might best be described as—in the 
words of Professor Heisbourg—a vision for the future of European security policy:  
 
It analyses the world and then goes on to state its vision of the manner in 
which the EU could present itself within that world… But it is not a strategy in 
                                                 
1 European Council (2003), European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better 
World, Brussels, 12 December 2003, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf. 
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the sense that it says: here are the means towards the end and this is how we 
are going to deploy those means towards those ends.2 
 
Despite this fact, the ESS has become an important touchstone for those parts of the 
Council and Commission concerned with issues of security and organised crime.3 
According to a recent report on the implementation of the ESS, the strategy has 
provided the basis for the development of a range of measures that have made it easier 
to pursue investigations across borders and to coordinate criminal prosecutions.4 In 
particular, the report notes that since the strategy was first adopted, the European 
Union has developed a number of other more specific programmes and strategies, 
including the Hague Programme in 2004 and a new Strategy for the External 
Dimension of Justice and Home Affairs in 2005.5 In addition, there is a new EU 
Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which advocates a four-pronged approach to security and 
anti-terrorism: preventing radicalism; protecting targets; pursuing terrorists; and 
responding to the aftermaths of attacks.6 This EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy has also 
led to the appointment of a Counter-Terrorism Coordinator (CTC), who is responsible 
                                                 
2 Heisbourg as quoted in UK House of Lords European Union Committee (2008), 
Adapting the EU’s Approach to Today’s Security Challenges: The Review of the 2003 
European Security Strategy, 31st Report of Session 2007–08, HL Paper 190 (hereafter 
HL (2008) ESS Report), p. 9. This view was echoed by the then UK Minister for 
Europe, Jim Murphy MP, in his evidence to the House of Lords. According to Mr 
Murphy, the ESS is “a political declaration of intent about what Member States are 
willing to collectively enter into to support and protect their own and other 
populations… [I]t is not a legal document so it will always rely on political will” (p. 
9). 
3 Ibid, p. 16. 
4 High Representative for CFSP  (December 2008), Report on the Implementation of 
the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing World – Council 
document S407/08, endorsed at the European Council on 11-12 December 2008 
 (hereafter EC (2008) ESS Report), p. 4. 
5 European Council (November 2004), The Hague Programme: Strengthening 
Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union - OJ C 53 of 3 March 2005 
A Strategy on the External Dimension of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, 
COM(2005) 491. 
6 European Council (2005), The European Counter-Terrorism Strategy, Brussels, 30 
November 144469/4/05. 
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for overseeing the European response to terrorism and makes recommendations to the 
European Council.7 
 
1.2 Improving Coordination between Key EU Agencies 
 
One of the main successes of the ESS has been improving the levels of coordination 
between key EU agencies such as Europol and Eurojust. Although the EU does not 
play a direct role in counter-terrorism operations, under the auspices of the ESS it has 
been able to provide Member States with access to an increasingly sophisticated 
network of information and intelligence services. Both Europol and Eurojust have 
seen their roles expand since the adoption of the ESS, with the result that there is now 
greater operational coordination between the anti-terrorism activities of Member 
States and a more coherent approach to the development of domestic security 
policies.8  
 
More crucially, the ESS has also led to an expansion in the role of the EU Joint 
Situation Centre (SitCen). Previously focused on assessing external threats to EU 
security, it now also receives information and intelligence from Member States on 
internal threats, particularly those associated with terrorism. The creation in February 
2005 of a dedicated counter-terrorism division within its existing Civilian Intelligence 
Cell (CIC) has given SitCen the capacity to assess threats to transport and other parts 
of the critical infrastructure within the EU, as well as the ability to monitor trends in 
terrorist financing.9 Since 2005, SitCen has produced a series of intelligence-based 
reports for both the Council and the Commission, which have helped to inform and 
shape the development of EU policy in relation to counter-terrorism while also 
                                                 
7 European Council (2008), Discussion Paper on EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy: 
Report of the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, 19 November 2008, 15983/08 
(hereafter EC (2008) Report of the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator). 
8 EC (2008) ESS Report (fn 4 above). 
9 SitCen is currently divided into three main units: the Civilian intelligence Cell 
(CIC), which produces political and counter-terrorism assessment; the General 
Operations Unit (GOU), which operational support, research and non-intelligence 
analysis to Member States; and the Communications Unit, which deals with 
communications security and is responsible for the Council's communications centre 
(ComCen). 
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providing a firm foundation for cooperative operations and intelligence sharing 
between Member States. 
 
Finally, the introduction of the ESS—which explicitly recognises the threat posed to 
EU security by organised crime—has led to various initiatives designed to improve 
the ability of EU institutions and Member States to respond to the challenges of 
organised crime. The most notable of these has been the introduction of the annual 
Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OTCA), which is produced by Europol with 
contributions from Member States and key EU institutions such as the European 
Central Bank (ECB), European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction 
(ECMDDA), Eurojust, Frontex, and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF). The 
development of the OCTA will be discussed in the next section, alongside an 
overview of the key EU institutions involved in the prevention and prosecution of 
organised crime.  
 
1.3 Successes and Challenges  
 
The introduction of the ESS has undoubtedly raised awareness at all levels within the 
EU of the need for a more coordinated and efficient approach to matters of security, 
counter-terrorism, and organised crime. Although it does not provide a detailed “road-
map” for the development of policies per se, the vision it sets out has clearly 
influenced the development of policy since 2003 and led to the creation of new 
security institutions and the strengthening of existing agencies within the EU. Most 
recently, the influence of the ESS can be seen in the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) 
Council’s adoption of conclusions on the principle of convergence. These 
conclusions, which provide guidance on operational cooperation between Member 
States’ law-enforcement services, were discussed by the JHA Council at a meeting on 
24 October 2008 and aim to improve cooperation among Member States by 
promoting harmonisation of equipment and practice, joint action and legal 
frameworks. 
  
There is, however, an inherent tension at the centre of this aspirational (as opposed to 
prescriptive) approach to EU security, terrorism, and organised crime. Although there 
is clearly a collective interest in improving EU security and fostering greater 
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cooperation between Member States when it comes to matters of terrorism and 
organised crime, ultimately security and law enforcement are pursued at a national 
level. As a consequence, while the ESS has enjoyed broad support, Member States 
have nonetheless maintained control over nearly all aspects of their operational 
responses to security and criminal threats within the EU. Furthermore, Member States 
have thus far been largely unwilling to grant greater powers of investigation or 
prosecution to agencies like Europol or to increase the level of resources they 
currently provide in support of EU-level security and anti-terrorism activities. Instead, 
they have tended to act bilaterally when it comes to cross-border investigations, 
sharing information and intelligence on an ad hoc basis or in accordance with 
longstanding bilateral agreements.  
 
This fact was recently acknowledged by the Council in a report on the implementation 
of the ESS.10 While noting that the EU has made substantial progress in the area of 
security and organised crime in the last five years, the report concedes that there is 
still much to be done and that the ESS remains a work in progress. More specifically, 
the report openly states that there are still substantial improvements to be made in 
terms of coordination, both between the agencies of the EU and between the EU and 
Member States: 
 
We need to improve the way in which we bring together internal and external 
dimensions. Better co-ordination, transparency and flexibility are needed 
across different agencies, at national and European level. This was already 
identified in the ESS, five years ago. Progress has been slow and incomplete.11 
 
In part, the problem of coordination stems from the fact that a wide range of 
institutions and agencies are involved in the development of security and anti-
terrorism policy at the EU level.12 Although the introduction of a Counter-Terrorism 
Coordinator was a positive step, the Coordinator’s task has been made especially 
                                                 
10 EC (2008) ESS Report (fn 4 above). 
11 Ibid, p. 4. 
12 For a detailed analysis of this problem, see Keohane, Daniel (2005), “The EU and 
Counter-terrorism”, Centre for European Reform Report, pp. 17–22. 
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difficult by the sheer number of bodies he is required to deal with. In addition to 
Europol and Eurojust, the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator is also responsible for 
harmonising the activities of the terrorism working group (composed of national 
interior ministry officials), the foreign policy ‘working group on terrorism’ 
(composed of national foreign ministry officials), and the Police Chiefs’ Task Force. 
As has been argued by the Centre for European Reform, however, this situation is far 
from desirable and could have been avoided had Europol been given clear leadership 
on matters of security and counter-terrorism within the EU.13 
 
The challenges facing Europol and the development of a more coordinated approach 
to matters of security and anti-terrorism have unfortunately been exacerbated by the 
continuing uncertainty surrounding the future of the Lisbon Treaty. One of the 
expected consequences of the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty is the application of 
Article 88 of the Treaty on the Functioning on the European Union (TFEU), which 
aims to make Europol more accountable to the European Parliament and national 
Parliaments.14 Until these proposals are implemented and the detailed regulations 
governing the scrutiny of Europol are introduced, the institution is unlikely to be able 
to make any substantial progress in terms of expanding its coordinating role.  
 
                                                 
13 As noted in 2005 report of the Centre for European Reform, however, Europol has 
not been able to assume this role due to the reluctance of national police forces and 
intelligence agencies to share information with Europol. Keohane, ibid, p. 20.  
14 According to the text of Article 88 (originally Article III-276 of the Constitution 
Treaty): 
1. Europol’s mission shall be to support and strengthen action by the Member States’ 
police authorities and other law enforcement services and their mutual cooperation in 
preventing and combating serious crime affecting two or more Member States, terrorism 
and forms of crime which affect a common interest covered by a Union policy. 
2. The European Parliament and the Council, by means of regulations adopted in 
accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall determine Europol’s structure, 
operation, field of action and tasks. These tasks may include: 
a) the collection, storage, processing, analysis and exchange of information, in 
particular that forwarded by the authorities of the Member States or third countries or 
bodies; 
b) the coordination, organisation and implementation of investigative and operational 
action carried out jointly with the Member States’ competent authorities or in the 
context of joint investigative teams, where appropriate in liaison with Eurojust. 
These regulations shall also lay down the procedures for scrutiny of Europol’s activities 
by the European Parliament, together with national Parliaments. 
 14
 
Section Two: Organised Crime: The European Criminal Intelligence Model 
(ECIM) and the Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA) 
 
As has already been noted, one of the products of the ESS has been the development 
of a more coordinated approach to the problem of organised crime in the EU. In 
addition to providing a basis for the development of the European Criminal 
Intelligence Model (ECIM), the ESS has also led to a greater leadership role for 
Europol in detection and prevention of organised crime and to increased recognition 
for the work done by Eurojust. In the following sections, the work of Europol and 
Eurojust will be examined, with particular attention on the development of the ECIM 
and more recently the Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA).  
 
2.1 Europol and Eurojust 
 
Established under the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, Europol first became fully 
operational in 1999 (following ratification of the Europol Convention in 1998). 
Within the EU, Europol is the lead institution on matters of criminal intelligence; it 
exists to facilitate cooperation between national law enforcement agencies and to 
assist Member States in combating serious organised crime and terrorism.15 In 
practice, Europol provides a central hub for the sharing of information on organised 
crime and terrorism between Member States, while also producing its own 
intelligence briefings and analyses of crime trends.16  
                                                 
15 According to Article 3 of the Europol Convention (1998), Europol’s principal tasks 
are: (1) to facilitate the exchange of information between the Member States; (2) to 
obtain, collate, and analyse information and intelligence; (3) to notify the competent 
authorities of the Member States without delay via the national units referred to in 
Article 4 of information concerning them and of any connections identified between 
criminal offences; (4)  to aid investigations in the Member States by forwarding all 
relevant information to the national units; and (5) to maintain a computerised system 
of collected information containing data in accordance with Articles 8, 10 and 11 of 
the Convention. 
16 Bradley, Hugo (2008), “Europol and the European Criminal Intelligence Model: A 
Non-state Response to Organized Crime”, Policing 2(1): 103–9 (hereafter Bradley 
(2008) Europol and the ECIM), p. 106. Note that Article 6 of the Europol Convention 
sets out a clear legal framework for the exchange and analysis of information about 
crime and terrorism in the EU; it requires Europol to maintain both a computerised 
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Europol is not a police force in the traditional sense: its officers cannot, for example, 
make arrests or initiate investigations. Since its inception, it has therefore largely 
focused on improving its analytical capacity and providing informal leadership on 
matters of transnational crime and terrorism within the EU. Aside from hosting 
regular meetings of the European Police Chief’s Taskforce (PCTF)—which provides 
planning assistance for joint operations against organised crime networks within the 
EU—Europol also works closely with multi-state police teams organised under the 
Comprehensive Operational Strategic Planning for the Police (COSPOL) framework.  
 
Given that Europol is almost entirely dependent on information received from 
Member States, it inevitably relies heavily on the support of national policing 
agencies in order to fulfil its core objectives. As Hugo Bradley of the Centre for 
European Reform has recently observed, Europol has had to work hard to prove its 
worth and has still to gain the trust of some Member States and their domestic law 
enforcement agencies.17 In part, this task has not been made any easier by the 
bureaucratic structure within which Europol has been forced to operate. As Bradley 
notes:  
 
Even minor administrative decisions of [Europol’s] director need the 
unanimous approval of all twenty-seven EU countries represented on its 
management board. Moreover, under the Convention, Europol analysts and 
ordinary police officers can only work together via liaison officers in The 
Hague, themselves working through special units based in national capitals. 
The result can be bureaucratic standstill.18 
 
It has been agreed that Europol will be converted into a full EU agency as of 1 
January 2010, which will make amending the legislation governing its remit and 
                                                                                                                                            
information system (the Europol Information System [EIS]) and analysis work files 
(AWFs). 
17 Bradley, ibid, p. 107. 
18 Ibid, p. 108. 
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procedures more straightforward and less time consuming.19 At their meeting in April 
2008, JHA Ministers reached a political agreement for a Council Decision conferring 
EU agency status to Europol as of January 2010. The Council Decision, which will 
replace the current Europol Convention, has not adopted yet - due to some 
parliamentary reservations. Intergovernmental financing will be replaced with 
Community financing. Europol's mandate will be extended to cover all serious forms 
of cross-border crime. 
In addition to Europol, the EU also relies on Eurojust to aid in the investigation and 
prosecution of serious cross-border and organised crime. An EU agency, Eurojust was 
established in 2002 and provides a forum for prosecutors and judicial authorities from 
Member States to share information and expertise, with a view to producing a more 
coordinated response to serious and organised crime within the EU. Eurojust also 
works closely with national agencies to assist in the extradition of suspects and the 
sharing of evidence between Member States, often helping to draft and implement 
bilateral agreements between Member States. In December 2008, the Council adopted 
a Decision on the strengthening of Eurojust - amending Decision 2002/187/JHA 
setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight against serious crime. 
Like Europol, Eurojust was originally intended to enhance cooperation and improve 
efficiency within the EU by providing a central point of reference for all cross-border 
investigations and prosecutions within the EU. Although its caseload has grown 
steadily since its inception, to date Eurojust appears to have suffered less from 
problems of bureaucracy and lack of trust than Europol.20 It is almost universally 
regarded as an improvement on the previous system of coordinating multi-country 
prosecutions, which was administered under the authority of the Council of Europe.21 
 
In simple terms, Europol and Eurojust provide the main institutional structure for the 
investigation and prosecution of serious and organised crime in the EU. Because they 
are still relatively young organisations, they are both still in the process of gaining the 
                                                 
19 JHA Council Press Release, Brussels, 18 April 2008, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/610&format=HTML
&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=fr).  
20 Eurojust Annual Report, 2006, p.24. 
21 Bradley (2008) Europol and the ECIM (fn 16 above), p.106. 
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trust of Member States and establishing effective and efficient working arrangements 
with their national partners and other EU institutions. In recent years, a number of key 
initiatives have been developed to enhance the work done by these two institutions, 
most notably the European Criminal Intelligence Model (ECIM) and the Organised 
Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA). Both of these initiatives have their origins in 
decisions taken under the Hague Programme in November 2004, most notably to 
promote intelligence-led policing practices within Member States and to produce 
high-quality threat assessments that can be used to guide both EU and national 
policing policies and strategies. An overview and analysis of the ECIM and the 
OCTA are provided in the following two sections.  
 
2.2 The European Criminal Intelligence Model (ECIM) 
 
The European Criminal Intelligence Model (ECIM) was agreed by a meeting of 
European Interior Ministers in 2005. It sets out a new strategy for the sharing of 
information between the law enforcement agencies of Member States and Europol. 
Drawing heavily on the ideas of intelligence-led policing (as developed in the United 
Kingdom and the United States), the ECIM stresses the importance of producing joint 
assessments of serious and organised crime, based on shared intelligence and direct 
input from national police forces within the EU.22 According to the ECIM, threat 
assessment should be constructed according to the following four steps:  
 
(1) Police forces of Member States share information and intelligence with Europol.  
(2) Europol drafts an assessment of the overall level of threat facing the EU.  
(3) This assessment provides the basis for a Council of Ministers agreement on joint 
law enforcement priorities between the Member States. 
                                                 
22 As noted in a recent UK House of Lords report on Europol, the ECIM was directly 
influenced by the National Intelligence Model (NIM) used in the United Kingdom (as 
set out in the Code of Practice on the NIM issued in January 2005 by the UK Home 
Secretary). UK House of Lords European Union Committee (2008), Europol: 
Coordinating the Fight against Serious and Organised Crime, 29th Report of Session 
2007–08, HL Paper 183 (hereafter HL (2008) Europol Report), p. 26. 
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(4) EU police chiefs implement joint operations in line with the Council of Ministers 
agreement and then relay any information and intelligence that they generate back 
to Europol (which can then use the information for future threat assessments).23 
 
Although it has been suggested that some Member States and national police forces 
have yet to fully embrace the ECIM, there appears to be broad agreement that the 
model has helped to harmonise policing practices across the EU and to introduce 
“modern” intelligence-led strategic planning. In their evidence to a recent UK House 
of Lords report on Europol, representatives of the UK’s Serious and Organised Crime 
Organisation (SOCA) stated:  
 
[T]he ECIM/OTCA model is ushering in a new phase in the development of 
Europol, establishing the agency as a central intelligence base in the EU 
supporting a range of sub-regional initiatives around the EU. This approach is 
exactly in line with our aspirations for the organisation.24 
 
The success of the ECIM is reflected in the influence that it has had on the 2009 
Europol Work Programme.25 Although no specific reference is made to the ECIM in 
the document, the Programme repeatedly refers to decisions taken by the JHA 
Council in October 2005 and to the importance of intelligence-led policing. It is also 
important to note that the ECIM has provided the basis for another key initiative, 
namely the Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA), which is discussed below.  
 
2.3 The Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA) 
 
Prior to 2006, there was no mechanism within the EU for the production of forward-
looking assessments of the threat posed to Member States by serious and organised 
crime. Although Europol produced an annual Organised Crime Report (OCR), it was 
backward looking, largely descriptive, and based on historical statistical data. In 2004, 
however, the Hague Programme instructed Europol to produce the first Organised 
                                                 
23 Bradley (2008) Europol and the ECIM (fn 16 above), p. 107. 
24 HL (2008) Europol Report (fn 22 above), p. 28. 
25 European Council (2008), Europol Work Programme 2009, Document 7801/08. 
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Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA) as part of its effort to promote intelligence-led 
policing practices within the EU. Designed to complement the ECIM, the OCTA is an 
annual document produced on the basis of information and intelligence supplied to 
Europol by Member States. It aims to guide the policing priorities of Member States 
via the Police Chief Task Force (PCTF/COSPOL) framework and through direct 
distribution of the assessment document to law enforcement agencies at a national 
level. According to the introduction to the 2008 OCTA, 
 
To support decision-makers in the best possible way, the OCTA provides a 
well-targeted, qualitative assessment of the threat from organised crime. The 
OCTA is based on a multi-source approach, including law enforcement and 
non-law enforcement contributions.26 
 
These contributions are drawn from a wide array of EU-level and national institutions, 
including: the European Central Bank; the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and 
Drug Addiction (ECMDDA); Eurojust; Frontex; and the European Anti-Fraud Office 
(OLAF). In addition, the OCTA draws on information provided by countries outside 
the EU and on international law enforcement organisations such as the International 
Criminal Police Organisation (Interpol). 
 
At a practical level, the OCTA aims to ensure that police operations conducted by 
Member States are driven by strategically relevant intelligence and that the 
appropriate law enforcement instruments are used.27 For the most part, the OCTA 
appears to be succeeding in this aim, although some commentators have questioned 
whether the information being provided via the Assessments is having the desired 
effect on operational practices. According to Dr Nicholas Ridley of the John Grieve 
Centre in London, while the OCTA is “a magnificent tour de force from an academic, 
strategic analysis point of view … the unfortunate thing is that OCTA is not really 
operationally oriented.”28 This is problem that has been at least partly acknowledged 
                                                 
26 Europol (2008), EU Organised Crime Assessment (OCTA), p. 9. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Evidence to the UK House of Lords. See HL (2008) Europol Report (fn 22 above), 
p. 28. 
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by Europol itself, with the introduction to the 2008 OCTA noting that “the OTCA 
itself is not detailed enough to pinpoint specific criminal investigations.”29  
 
The development of the OTCA also appears to have been hampered by the fact that 
some Member States seem unwilling to provide the required information and 
intelligence to Europol. As Bradley has noted, while in 2006 one Member State 
submitted over 500 pages of criminal intelligence to the first OCTA, another 
contributed only “a single page”.30 In addition, because the OTCA does not include 
any assessment of terrorist threats, it can be argued that it is only of limited use to 
Member States as regards the development of comprehensive law enforcement and 
security strategies.  
 
2.4 Centralising Control or Creating Channels? 
 
One of the key questions that needs to be asked about the current EU approach to 
organised crime is whether it is designed to encourage greater centralisation or instead 
to lead to the dispersal of investigative and preventative functions. Put another way, 
there appears to be a developing tension between the desire to give Europol (and 
Eurojust) a more prominent role in the development and coordination of EU-wide 
responses to serious and organised crime on the one hand, and the stated aim of 
enabling Member States and national agencies to produce better informed local 
strategies on the other hand. This is a tension that is exacerbated by the fact that 
Europol is unable to gather information for itself or to generate intelligence without 
direct input from Member States—in reality, it is ultimately Member States and 
national law enforcement bodies that are responsible for investigating and prosecuting 
those responsible for serious and organised crime. 
 
This problem has been recognised by Hugo Bradley of the Centre for European 
Reform, who has rightly counselled against greater centralisation of cross-border 
policing functions. According to Bradley, further efforts in this direction are likely to 
be hampered by intractable differences in policing and prosecutorial practices across 
                                                 
29 Europol (2008), EU Organised Crime Assessment (OCTA), p. 9. 
30 Bradley (2008) Europol and the ECIM (fn 16 above), p. 107. 
 21
Member States and by Europol’s lack of investigatory powers. Instead, Bradley 
argues that the EU should continue to focus on encouraging Member States to “buy 
into” the existing ECIM, foster informal as well as formal mechanisms of 
cooperation, and work towards ensuring that the EU becomes a “focal point for the 
emergence of a new pan-European community of police officers.”31  
 
These suggestions are particularly apposite when one considers that how little time 
the existing EU policing structure has had to develop. It is reasonable to think that 
building trust in institutions such as Europol and Eurojust will take considerable time, 
and as such there is a strong argument for ensuring that progress in this area should be 
steady and incremental. 
                                                 
31 Ibid, p. 108. 
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3. Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
Based on the overview provided in this briefing paper, it is possible to identify a 
number of key areas of concern regarding the current approach taken by the EU to 
matters of security, organised crime, and counter-terrorism. The following 
conclusions and recommendations are intended to provide guidance to the European 
Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) on how 
to address these concerns and to suggest possible areas for future research and action.  
 
Before moving to the specific recommendations, is it important to draw attention to 
the lack of available evidence on the operational practices and effectiveness of the 
various institutions discussed in this briefing paper. Despite the fact that Europol 
produces an annual report and publishes the yearly OCTA, there is very little detailed 
information available in the public domain about its workings or its relationship with 
specific Member States or national law enforcement agencies. Although it is not 
surprising, given the sensitive nature of the work undertaken by Europol, this lack of 
transparency needs to be addressed if Europol (and Eurojust) are to play an enhanced 
role in the provision of security and policing services across the EU. Public as well as 
institutional confidence in such institutions is vital for their long-term success, and 
they should therefore endeavour to provide as much information—in easily 
understandable and accessible forms—to the public as possible. In addition, it is clear 
that there has been very little in the way of independent research into the operation of 
the ECIM and the development of the OTCA. Given their central importance to the 
overall EU security and policing strategy, this is regrettable—and a deficiency that 
LIBE and other relevant EU bodies should consider rectifying in the future (either by 
encouraging and sponsoring such research or by facilitating access to relevant 
institutions by independent researchers and research organisations). 
 
3.1 Recommendation One: The Need for Simplicity and Transparency  
 
As even this short briefing paper demonstrates, the current EU structure for the 
investigation and prevention of organised crime and terrorism is extremely complex. 
Aside from the fact that this complexity may make it more difficult for individuals 
and agencies within Member States to access the full range of law-enforcement and 
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intelligence services provided by the EU, this complex arrangement also increases the 
likelihood that information will not be effectively or efficiently shared between 
various EU institutions or between the EU and Member States. As such, there is a 
pressing need for a comprehensive review of the existing structures, with a view to 
rationalising the relationships between the various institutions responsible for 
security, serious crime and terrorism and making the operation of these institutions 
more transparent.  
 
3.2 Recommendation Two: A Committee on Internal Security 
 
Building on Recommendation One, the European Parliament should welcome the 
possibility - foreseen in the Lisbon Treaty - of establishing a "Committee on Internal 
Security", which would have overarching responsibility for developing policy and 
coordinating EU efforts in relation to security, serious crime, and terrorism. Article 71 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) states: "A standing 
Committee shall be set up within the Council in order to ensure that operational 
cooperation on internal security is promoted and strengthened within the Union". 
Establishing such a Committee would not only provide a strong basis for greater 
coordination of existing EU institutions (such as Europol and Eurojust) but also make 
the structure more readily accessible to Member States and their national law 
enforcement agencies.32 It has already been suggested that a single European law-
enforcement coordination body comprised of Europol, Eurojust, and the Police 
Chief’s Task Force (PCTF/COSPOL) could provide the basis for such a committee,33 
                                                 
32 Although the primary function of this Committee would be to enhance police 
cooperation within the EU, ideally it would also act as a point of contact for third 
party, non-EU law enforcement agencies.  
33 Ibid. It is worth noting that in response to a request from the JHA  Council 
(Document 9718/08), Europol and Eurojust have recently amended their cooperation 
agreement. Furthermore, in a discussion paper produced by the Counter-Terrorism 
Coordinator in November 2008, the CTC notes that “detailed provisions on the 
exchange of information have been included [in the draft agreement] with the aim to 
facilitate a systematic, reciprocal and timely flow of information between the two 
bodies and to improve Eurojust’s involvement in Europol’s Analysis Work Files”. EC 
(2008) Report of the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator (fn 7 above), p. 4. The work of 
this Committee could also be considerably enhanced by ensuring that it has a formal 
relationship with the European Defence Agency (which would provide the basis for 
joint policy development and the exchange of information). 
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and this briefing paper strongly suggests that the European Parliament should 
consider the feasibility of such a merger and the potential advantages of such an 
approach.34 In addition, the EP should also consider whether other agencies – such as 
the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) and the European Data Protection Supervisor 
(EDPS) – could be involved in the activities of the Committee (or at the very least 
oversee its work in an advisory capacity).  
 
3.3 Recommendation Three: A Coordinated Approach to Data Sharing 
 
The final recommendation of this briefing paper is to suggest that the European 
Parliament should consider providing increased support to Europol and the Counter-
Terrorism Coordinator as they assess the implications of the Swedish Framework 
Decision35 and the Prüm Decision36 for information sharing within the existing EU 
policing structures. Formally adopted into EU law in 2008, the Prüm Decision 
introduces a range of reforms to existing data sharing practices. Given that data 
sharing and the exchange of intelligence is at the heart of the ECIM and OCTA, 
careful thought must be given to how best to implement these provisions, with a view 
to ensuring that they enhance rather than impede cooperation. To this end, the 
European Parliament should whenever possible encourage independent research into 
the likely effects of the Prüm Decision on data sharing within the EU and address the 
specific concerns raised by the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator concerning the future 
governance of EU information exchange.37 Furthermore, consideration should also be 
                                                 
34 It should be noted that the establishment of such a body may go some way towards 
meeting the concerns of Member States such as Austria, which has called for greater 
operational coordination within the EU and the establishment of an “internal security 
architecture”. See Resolution of the Austrian Parliament (2001), Security and Defence 
Doctrine, http://www.bka.gv.at/DocView.axd?CobId=3604. Ideally, this body would 
also include a representative from the European Defence Agency (or at least have a 
formal relationship with the agency which could provide the basis for joint policy 
development and exchange of information). 
35 JHA Council Decision 2006/960/JHA of 18 December 2006 on simplifying the 
exchange of information and intelligence between law enforcement authorities of the 
Member States of the European Union. 
36 JHA Council Decision 2008/615/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the stepping up of cross-
border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime. 
37 EC (2008) Report of the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator (fn 7 above), p. 4. 
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given to the possible role that could be played by the Fundamental Rights Agency 
(FRA) in the development of any data sharing regulations or governance 
arrangements. The development of the EU’s security and policing structures is still in 
its early stages, and by providing this support the European Parliament will be making 
a substantial contribution to the creation of a more effective and efficient approach to 
the problems of organised crime and terrorism.  
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